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Guatemala’s Historical Clarification Commission:
An Actor-based Analysis of Effectiveness
Vindya Seneviratne
In the Latin American country of Guatemala, the latter half of the
twentieth century signified a tumultuous period of conflict and
dictatorship that left all sectors of the nation in shambles following
the end of the Cold War and subsequent emergence of
democratization as a widespread phenomenon. What has been
characterized as a thirty-year civil war ended in 1994, with the
introduction of peace talks between the Guatemalan government and
the main rebel faction, Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional
Guatemalteca (URNG).1 The long, drawn-out talks produced many
outcomes for the transition of Guatemala into a democratic state,
among them the creation of the Commission for Historical
Clarification (Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, or CEH).2
The CEH was unique because it was the first time in the
history of the country that an official body had accused the
government of genocide being perpetrated during the civil war.3 The
nation was also unique, given the multitude of actors involved in the
perpetuation of conflict. The government, military, and rebel groups
were the most obvious parties involved in negotiating a peace for
Guatemala. However, behind the scenes were the efforts of civil
1

Leah Barkoukis and Charles Villa-Vicencio, “Truth Commissions: a Comparative
Study,” Conflict Resolution Program, Georgetown University, Washington DC and
Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Cape Town, August 2011, 1.
2 Amy Ross, “The Creation and Conduct of the Guatemalan Commission for
Historical Clarification,” Geoforum 37, (2006), 74.
3 Christian Tomuschat, “Clarification Commission in Guatemala,” Human Rights
Quarterly 23.2 (May 2001), 234.
Undergraduate Transitional Justice Review, Vol.4, Iss.1, 2013, 65-87

Published by Scholarship@Western, 2013

1

Undergraduate Transitional Justice Review, Vol. 4 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 6

Vindya Seneviratne 66

society, comprised of various different groups, as well as the Catholic
Church. Each of these actors played a unique role in bringing about
the CEH. Moreover, they also played varying roles in the conduct of
the commission. Finally, each group involved in the CEH were
impacted differently by its outcomes. Therefore, this paper takes the
approach of examining each of these groups one at a time, in order
to highlight their experiences with regard to the creation,
implementation, and effects of the CEH’s findings.
Overall, by discussing these groups, this paper seeks to
analyse the effectiveness of the Historical Clarification Commission
in Guatemala. Set against both the short- and long-term objectives
of the CEH, this paper will analyse the roles of the government, the
army, and the rebel movement against the short-term goals of
achieving accountability for the atrocities that occurred, and
eliminating the culture of impunity in Guatemala. The long-term
goals of peace and democracy are analysed by looking at the roles of
the Catholic Church and the many different factions of civil society
and how they were affected by the CEH. Ultimately, this paper
argues that the CEH has been somewhat effective in achieving its
short-term goals of accountability and elimination of impunity.
However, the path to lasting peace and democracy has a long way to
go, as seen through the reactions and emerging movements among
civil society and the Catholic Church.
The Historical Clarification Commission as a form of Restorative Justice
Before examining the CEH and its actors in depth, it is useful to
briefly recall key concepts and principles in transitional justice
concepts and principles. The CEH is commonly accepted to be a
truth commission (TC), which is a mechanism of restorative justice.
Truth commissions are defined as “temporary bodies, usually with an
official status, set up to investigate a past history of human rights
violations that took place within a country during a specified period
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of time.”4 Under optimal conditions, TCs have the ability to facilitate
positive change in a post-conflict society. While there is no “one size
fits all” description of a truth commission, they generally seek to first
and foremost establish the truth about the past. Other goals that are
relevant to the CEH include fostering accountability for perpetrators
of human rights violations, recommending necessary legal and
institutional reforms, and helping to consolidate a democratic
transition.5 Absent from these stated objectives are the details of the
negotiated compromise that result in the creation of mechanisms
such as TCs. This is especially relevant to the case of Guatemala, as
the negotiating parties, in framing the CEH, also created the powers
and constraints under which it operated.6
Context: Guatemala’s Path to Transitional Justice
The end of the 1980s marked the close of many military-dominated
regimes in Latin America. The principle of the “right to truth”
became an emerging concept during this time, as civil society groups
pushed governments to become accountable for their actions during
the past decades of civil war.7 Accountability, as the activists saw it,
was the answer to the culture of secrecy and impunity generated by
decades of conflict and human rights violations.
Guatemala’s first attempt at a truth commission occurred in
1985, before the end of the civil war. Under the military dictatorship
of General Mejia Victores, a commission was formed to investigate
disappearances that had taken place in the country. Before it could
interview its first witnesses, the commission was disbanded citing that
it was “it was impossible to determine the whereabouts of the people
4 Patrick

Ball and Audrey R. Chapman, “The Truth of Truth Commissions:
Comparative Lessons from Haiti, South Africa, and Guatemala,” Human Rights
Quarterly 23.1 (February 2001), 2.
5 Mark Freeman and Joanna R. Quinn, “Lessons Learned: Practical Lessons
Gleaned from Inside the Truth Commissions of Guatemala and South Africa,”
Human Rights Quarterly 25.4 (November 2003), 1120. See article for complete list of
goals of TCs to 2003.
6 Ross, “The Creation and Conduct of the Guatemalan Commission for Historical
Clarification,” 73.
7 Ibid., 71.
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claimed to be disappeared.”8 The topic of human rights and a truth
commission were not brought up in earnest again until the Oslo
Peace Accords in 1994. In June of that year, the Guatemalan
government and the URNG signed accords in Oslo, Norway which
mandated the creation of a “Commission for the Historical
Clarification of Human Rights Violations and Other Acts of Violence
that Have Caused the Suffering of the Guatemalan People.”9
The CEH did not start its work until the closing day of the
Agreement for a Firm and Lasting Peace in 1996, after which it was
to have six months (with a possibility of extending a further six
months) to complete its mandate.10 Overall, the CEH investigated
more than 7,500 cases derived from interviews and documented a
total of 24,910 killings.11 On February 25, 1999 the CEH presented
its information publicly in the form of a report entitled Guatemala:
Memory of Silence (henceforth referred to as “the CEH report”). The
report found that the State was responsible for 93% of the more than
600 massacres document in its 3500 pages.12 The report concluded
that while the state and rebel groups were the main perpetrators, the
consequence of state policies of intolerance, exclusion, and racism
implicated Guatemalan society as a whole.13
In its recommendations, the CEH report called for the State
to apply the National Reconciliation Law by criminally prosecuting
and convicting the perpetrators of genocide, torture, and forced
disappearances.14 Overall, it was hoped that the CEH’s findings and
recommendations would promote a move towards prioritizing
human rights and democratization of the state.15 However, this was
8

Ibid., 73.
“The Creation and Conduct of the Guatemalan Commission for Historical
Clarification,” 74.
10 Tomuschat, “Clarification Commission in Guatemala,” 241.
11 Ball and Chapman, “The Truth of Truth Commissions,” 8.
12 Ross, “The Creation and Conduct of the Guatemalan Commission for Historical
Clarification,” 79.
13 Jan Perlin, “The Guatemalan Historical Clarification Commission Finds
Genocide,” ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law 6 (1999-2000), 396.
14 Ibid., 412.
15 Tomuschat, “Clarification Commission in Guatemala,” 240.
9 Ross,
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not the case. At least in the immediate months following its release,
scholars found that the CEH report did not affect political change in
Guatemala.16 In the short-term, the creation, implementation and
outcomes of the CEH faced challenges of accountability and
eliminating the culture of impunity in Guatemala.17 In the long-term
the CEH and its legacy face the difficult task of establishing a
peaceful and democratic society.
The CEH in the Short-Term: Seeking Accountability and Elimination of
Impunity
Having established the context for its establishment, this section will
now look at the roles of the government, army, and UNRG in the
creation, implementation, and outcome of the CEH. The country has
only been at “peace” for nineteen years, and therefore it is difficult to
analyse the effectiveness of the CEH in its long-term goal of
establishing a peaceful and democratic nation. However, the shortterm goals of accountability and elimination of impunity can be
determined by closely examining the roles of government, army, and
rebel groups.
One of the main points of agreement between these groups
that led to its creation was the CEH’s policy of not naming names in
its final report. This generated widespread concern that the
commission would actually encourage the culture of impunity that
had been rampant in wartime Guatemala.18 As an already-integrated
component of Guatemala’s politics, impunity was seen as interfering
with a TC achieving its goals of producing a consensus history,
promoting reconciliation, and ending violence.19 This culture of
16 Kathleen Dill, “Reparations and the Illusive Meaning of Justice in Guatemala,” in
Waging War, Making Peace: Reparations and Human Rights, edited by Barbara Rose
Johnston and Susan Slymovics (Walnut Creek, California: Left Coast Press, Inc.,
2009), 187.
17 Ross, “The Creation and Conduct of the Guatemalan Commission for Historical
Clarification,” 69.
18 Ibid., 74.
19 Anita Isaacs, “At War with the Past? The Politics of Truth Seeking in
Guatemala,” The International Journal of Transitional Justice 4 (2010): 254.
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impunity, according the CEH report, took control of the very
structure of the state, becoming both a means and an end.20 Scholars
point out that even the Accords, including the CEH that resulted,
were thwarted by political groups—the government, army, and rebel
groups—who sought to avoid prosecution and punishment.21 This
culture of impunity has the effect of making grassroots participation
more difficult. For example, the process of achieving justice from
gendered violence is affected by impunity. Those who experienced
rape and other crimes against women during the civil war are afraid
to seek out justice given that they lived “next door” to perpetrators,
especially in rural communities.22
While the CEH and other post-conflict measures have
worked to battle this culture of impunity, it persisted in Guatemalan
society decades after the end of the war. Between 2000 and 2008, the
Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office in Guatemala registered over
1,300 attacks on “truth defenders,” which the office defines as
“individuals who either furnish evidence about atrocities or who
publicly demand accountability.”23 While this is hardly the kind of
statistic ideally found in a society transitioning to democracy, it is still
a step up from Guatemala’s previous record of genocidal violence.
Molina-Mejia asserts that the political/psychological dimension of
impunity has been weakened, in part due to the work of the CEH. 24
Using these goals of accountability and eliminating impunity
as a basis for analysis, this paper will now examine each of the groups
directly involved in the Oslo Peace Accords, which allowed for the
creation of the Historical Clarification Commission in Guatemala.

20

Anika Oettler, “Encounters with History: Dealing with the ‘Present Past’ in
Guatemala,” European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 81 (October
2006), 12.
21 Raul Molina-Mejia, “The Struggle Against Impunity in Guatemala,” Social Justice
26.4 (Winter 1999), 68.
22 Alison Crosby and M. Brinton Lykes, “Mayan Women Survivors Speak: The
Gendered Relations of Truth Telling in Postwar Guatemala,” The International
Journal of Transitional Justice 5 (2011), 462.
23 Isaacs, “At War with the Past?” 270.
24 Molina-Mejia, “The Struggle Against Impunity in Guatemala,” 66.
Undergraduate Transitional Justice Review, Vol.4, Iss.1, 2013, 65-87

https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/undergradtjr/vol4/iss1/6

6

Seneviratne: Guatemala’s Historical ClarificationCommission

71 Guatemala’s Historical Clarification Commission

International Actors – The United Nations
During its formation as well as its operation, the UN provided ongoing support to the commission.25 Specifically, the UN Human
Rights Observer Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) was
instrumental in the facilitation of peace negotiations by acting as a
mediator.26 Other than the Secretary-General’s appointment of
German lawyer Christian Tomuschat as one of the commissioners,
the UN was essentially uninvolved in the CEH investigation and
report. The UN viewed the CEH as being based on an agreement
between the Government of Guatemala and the guerrilla
organization, and was not a UN institution.27 Therefore while it is
important to mention their involvement, this paper will not be
analysing the United Nations as a key actor in the CEH’s creation,
implementation, and outcome.
The State: Government of Guatemala
The 1999 CEH report concluded that “the violence [in Guatemala]
was fundamentally directed by the State against the excluded, the
poor and above all, the Mayan people, as well as against those who
fought for justice and greater social equality.”28 The “State” in this
instance refers to the government, as the ideological backing, as well
as the army, as the physical manifestation of the government’s
attacks. This section will discuss specifically the government of
Guatemala, which includes its political parties and leaders, both past
and present. This paper’s analysis of the government supports the
argument that accountability was achieved through the publication of
the CEH report. However, the second short-term goal of eliminating
impunity has not been significantly sought after. As scholars Audrey
Chapman and Patrick Ball assert, the CEH emerged out of a
25

Laurel E. Fletcher, Jamie Rowen and Harvey M. Weinstein. “Context, Timing
and the Dynamics of Transitional Justice: A Historical Perspective,” Human Rights
Quarterly 31.1 (February 2009), 177.
26 David A. Crocker, “Transitional Justice and International Civil Society: Toward a
Normative Framework,” Constellations 5.4 (1999), 511.
27 Tomuschat, “Clarification Commission in Guatemala,” 248.
28 Ball and Chapman, “The Truth of Truth Commissions,” 32.
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negotiated settlement where “the architects of violence and abuses,”
or the government, still retained political influence and power.29
From the beginning of the CEH’s implementation, the
government proved to be a difficult party to deal with. In September
of 1997, the CEH wrote to the President, Álvaro Arzú, requesting
detailed information regarding four prominent cases of
disappearances in the history of the country.30 Commissioner
Tomuschat recalled that the government did not respond to said
request, stating that the letter “got lost.”31 Such is an example of the
government’s failure to face accountability from the start of CEH’s
investigations.
Nonetheless, the CEH was able to conduct its investigations
without a great deal of assistance from the government. In its 1999
report, the CEH sought to demonstrate that, within the central
power structure of the state, under the control of the various leaders
in the bureaucracy, specific commands were given to essentially be
prepared for anything. Tomuschat contends that “anything” in this
case referred specifically to forcible disappearances, murder, and
torture.32 Therefore the report directly implicated the government in
Guatemala’s decades of violence—an example of the achievement of
accountability in a public forum. The leaders in government were
labeled “intellectual authors” of the violence by the CEH report; it
was these men who ordered communities to be massacred, and
genocide to be committed33 without any regard for the consequences
on human rights or democracy as a whole. The short-term goal of
accountability was therefore aggressively addressed by the CEH’s
investigations.
On the other hand, the outcome of the CEH report was a
step back in achieving accountability. As the commission’s results
29

Ibid., 12.
Tomuschat, “Clarification Commission in Guatemala,” 249.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., 251.
33 Rachel Hatcher, “Truth and Forgetting in Guatemala: An Examination of
Memoria del Silenco and Nunca Mas,” Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean
Studies 34.67 (2009), 147.
30
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were being presented on February 25, 1999 it was reported that
President Arzú “appeared stunned.”34 Three weeks after, Arzú posted
a full-page statement in the Guatemalan press repudiating many of
the commission’s recommendations.35 Moreover, the government
also declined to establish many of the CEH’s recommendations,
including a follow-up to the CEH itself.36 The failure to be
accountable was not just within the office of the President. Many
other politicians outright dismissed the CEH’s findings immediately
following the report’s publication.37 Thus, while the short-term goal
of accountability was addressed by the government’s creation of the
CEH, its role in the commission’s implementation and report showed
a vehement lack of accountability on the part of Guatemalan
leadership.
Even though the presiding regime was not directly involved
in any of the atrocities investigated by the CEH, the Arzú
administration, in denying the findings of the CEH report, were in no
way excused for their denial of accountability. Therefore, the leaders
in power when the massacres occurred were even less excusable for
their actions during their reign. However, as illustrated above,
impunity permeated the Guatemalan political atmosphere. General
Efrain Rios Montt was one of the dictators responsible for the
massacres that occurred in the 1980s.38 A few days after the CEH
report was published, General Montt defended the accusations of his
regime’s “scorched earth tactics” by pointing the finger at the
guerrilla army, who he claims used civilians as human shields.39 In
doing this, Montt denied all accountability for his actions, as well as
the actions of the Guatemalan government at the time of the
34 Greg

Grandin, “Chronicles of a Guatemalan Genocide Foretold: Violence,
Trauma, and the Limits of Historical Inquiry,” Nepantla: Views from the South 1.2
(2000), 408.
35 Elizabeth Oglesby, “Educating Citizens in Postwar Guatemala: Historical
Memory, Genocide, and the Culture of Peace,” Radical History Review 2007.97
(January 2007), 78.
36 Isaacs, “At War with the Past?” 254.
37 Grandin, “Chronicles of a Guatemalan Genocide Foretold,” 408.
38 Ball and Chapman, “The Truth of Truth Commissions,” 35.
39 Oettler, “Encounters with History,” 8.
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massacres. Montt’s position also demonstrates the culture of
impunity in Guatemala. In November 1999, less than a year after the
CEH report was released, Montt won the Guatemalan elections in a
landslide victory and became the leader of the country once again.40
The fact that the very leader accused of genocide by the CEH
became the next President of Guatemala demonstrates just how
much impunity still existed in Guatemala. Along with the denial of
accountability, this impunity caused the government of Guatemala to
lack legitimacy, despite the workings of the CEH. Therefore, while in
the short-term, the CEH worked towards the goals of accountability
and eliminating impunity, the actions of government leaders in
Guatemala essentially overturned the work of the commission and
slowed the process of transition into a democratic country.

40

Ball and Chapman, “The Truth of Truth Commissions,” 35.
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The State: Guatemala’s Armed Forces
As the strong arm of the dictatorial governments that ruled during
the civil war, the army was the direct perpetrator of the Guatemalan
genocide. In addition to the Armed Forces, were the paramilitary
groups known as Civil Defense Patrols (PACs), which were made up
of civilian personnel recruited by the army to commit the atrocities.
PAC leaders were directed to “defend” their communities against the
guerrilla groups; some of the members were forced to commit
atrocities against their will.41 (Henceforth, both the PACs and Armed
Forces will be referred to as “the army,” unless otherwise indicated.)
This is because it is often hard to distinguish which group were the
perpetrators in any given witness’ testimonial. Similar to the
government leaders mentioned above, the army denied all
accountability of the genocide in the implementation and outcome of
the CEH.
The military possessed large amounts of data that the CEH
might have utilized in its investigation. However, the army did not
release a great number of these records. Following the publication of
the CEH report in 1999, some of the records were released from a
secret military archive. These records described the fate of 200
victims who were “disappeared” by the military.42 Because these
records were released after the publication of the report, they were
not included in the CEH’s investigation and recommendations. It is
estimated that these records were just a small portion of the data that
has since likely been hidden or destroyed.43 The military contended
that the CEH had “no right” to see their archives, a viewpoint that
Tomuschat labels “a deliberate strategy of obstruction.”44
The army’s denial of accountability was displayed most
prominently after the CEH report was published. According to the
report:
41

Julie Stewart, “A Measure of Justice: The Rabinal Human Rights Movement in
Post-War Guatemala,” Qualitative Sociology 31 (July 2008), 236.
42 Ball and Chapman, “The Truth of Truth Commissions,” 5.
43 Ball and Chapman, “The Truth of Truth Commissions,” 5.
44 Tomuschat, “Clarification Commission in Guatemala,” 250.
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During the armed confrontation, the State’s idea of the
“internal enemy”, intrinsic to the National Security Doctrine
[…] became the raison d’être of Army and State policies for
several decades. […] the CEH discovered [that] state forces
and related paramilitary groups were responsible for 93% of
the violations documented by the CEH...45
In addition to these findings, the CEH recommended army reforms
that included the purge of human right violators. It also called for a
new training doctrine in lieu of the “internal enemy” doctrine that
had seen so much death as a result.46 In response, the government
claimed that the army had already been reorganized and purged. It
therefore essentially ignored these recommendations.47 In addition to
refusing to follow through on the CEH’s recommendations, the
military denied the findings of the CEH.48 The armed forces claimed
that not a single one of their units had acted wrongly or violated the
rules outside of the context of war.49 When they did come forward,
members of the army told stories of insurgent abuse and generally
placing blame on guerrilla groups. By encouraging their soldiers to
testify in this manner, the military aimed to portray its soldiers as
victims rather than aggressors.50
By denying the findings of the CEH, the Guatemalan army
also denied accountability for its actions. Therefore, the short-term
goal of accountability was not achieved with respect to the military in
Guatemala. Moreover, by refusing to implement most of the CEH’s
recommendations which included an internal purge of the
perpetrators of genocide, the army continued to participate in the
45

La Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, Guatemala: Memoria del
Silencio (Guatemala: UNOPS, 1999).
46 Rachel Sieder. “War, Peace, and Memory Politics in Central America,” in The
Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies, edited by Paloma
Aguilar, Alexandra Barahona de Brito, and Carmen Gonzaléz-Enriquez. (Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press, 2001), 185.
47 Ibid.
48 Tomuschat, “Clarification Commission in Guatemala,” 250.
49 Ibid., 251.
50 Isaacs, “At War With the Past? “264.
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culture of impunity. Given that the CEH found the army to be
responsible for 93% of the atrocities under investigation, this was an
extremely large setback in Guatemala’s movement towards a peaceful
and democratic society.
Rebel Groups: URNG
The National Guatemalan Revolution Unity (URNG) was the main
rebel faction responsible for battling government forces throughout
the civil war. By the mid-1980s, the URNG, after keeping up the
fight for many decades, found themselves severely weakened as a
military force.51 Therefore, when the opportunity arose for peace
talks in 1994, the URNG was more than willing to attend. Although
the proposed truth commission presupposed blame on both sides of
the civil war, scholars contend that this might have proved beneficial
for the URNG.52 One of these reasons was that it would give the
rebels a greater amount of agency because it put them on a level
playing field with the armed forces.53 Therefore, even though this
playing field was based on mass atrocities, the rebel groups would be
addressed with similar agency to the army.
Understandably, the guerrilla organization was much more
cooperative than the Government and armed forces during the
implementation of the CEH’s investigations. They openly
acknowledged responsibility, and therefore showed accountability for
their crimes. Specifically, the URNG admitted responsibility for the
Aguacate massacre, where twenty-two farmers were executed for no
evident reasons.54 However, similar to the testimonies of the armed
forces, guerrilla forces were limited in their willingness to share their
stories. More often than not, URNG members focused their
testimonies on experiencing or witnessing military atrocities, instead
of explaining their own actions during the conflict. In the instances
that they did describe their own actions, rebel witnesses took time to
51

Sieder, “War, Peace, and Memory Politics in Central America,” 167.
“The Creation and Conduct of the Guatemalan Commission for Historical
Clarification,” 74.
53 Ibid.
54 Tomuschat, “Clarification Commission in Guatemala,” 252.
52 Ross,
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explain the extenuating circumstances that led them to take action.55
Therefore, while they were the most accountable of the three groups
directly involved in the creation of the CEH, they were not
completely willing to reveal their role in the massacres that occurred
during the civil war.
Regardless of the URNG’s unwillingness to reveal their true
experiences, the CEH was able to shape a narrative that implicated
both sides in the civil war. The report demonstrates that the
guerrillas’ record was in no way cleared of the massacres, executions,
and kidnappings characteristic of decades of civil war. The CEH
report reminds its audience that the URNG, as an active party in the
civil war, was obliged, at the very least, to respect international
human rights law.56 Quantitatively, the report found that:
Acts of violence attributable to the guerrillas represent 3%
of the violations registered by the CEH. This contrasts with
93% committed by agents of the State, especially the
Army... However, …this disparity does not lessen the
gravity of the unjustifiable offences committed by the
guerrillas against human rights.57
Therefore, the CEH held the URNG accountable for their
actions during the civil war by highlighting the gravity of their
violations.
Impunity is much more difficult to measure in terms of
rebel groups, because they were not given special privilege
above the law, as were the government and army. Christian
Tomuschat points out that the URNG has since transformed
itself into a political party.58 On the positive side, the
organization no longer utilises force to overthrow the
government’s actions, and has limited its extremist views.
However, although it has experienced a transformation, the
55 Isaacs,

“At War With The Past?” 263.
Commission for Historical Clarification, Memory of Silence, Section II. Paragraph
127.
57 Ibid., Section II. Paragraph 128.
58 Tomuschat, “Clarification Commission in Guatemala,” 234.

56
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URNG will always be associated with the atrocities that
occurred during the civil war. Therefore, awarding them public
office, given their poor human rights record, can in itself be
seen as a continuance of the culture of impunity. Compared to
the government and army, however, the URNG remains the
best exemplar of accountability and elimination of impunity in
the short-term period following the release of the CEH’s
report.
As a whole, the groups directly involved in the creation
of the CEH contributed somewhat to the short-term
transitional justice objectives of accountability for the atrocities,
as well as the elimination of impunity. The government, in
shaping the CEH, was addressing its accountability, but took a
step back when it denied the report’s findings. The army fared
worse, in both denying accountability and continuing with
impunity. The URNG, seeking parity with other powerful
actors, was the most compliant and accountable. But all three
actors can be seen to have continued to contribute to the
culture of impunity in Guatemala. In the short-term,
transitional justice has been achieved in a limited sense. The
next section’s examination at the long-term goals of the CEH,
as seen through the analysis of the Catholic Church and civil
society’s role, will measure of the effectiveness of the CEH as a
transitional justice mechanism in post-war Guatemala.
The CEH in the Long-Term: Seeking a Peaceful and Democratic Society
Determining a transitional justice mechanism’s effectiveness in
the long-term is a difficult task. In the Guatemalan case,
analysing the CEH’s effectiveness in the long-term does not
specify a window of time in which to analyse the commission.
Given that is has been almost two decades since the beginning
of peace talks, this paper utilizes some scholars’ more recent
findings to analyse the effectiveness of the CEH in the longterm. Moreover, since the CEH was negotiated in a top-down
fashion, the immediate effects and actions were analysed using
the higher-up groups in the social structure of Guatemala—the
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government and army. If effective, the CEH’s legacy should
eventually trickle down to the groups at the bottom of this
social hierarchy—nongovernmental organizations such as the
Catholic Church, and civil society, comprised of indigenous
groups, human rights activists, as well as women’s movements.
Therefore, actions and reactions of these groups following the
CEH report’s publication are analysed in detail against the longterm goal of achieving a peaceful and democratic society.
Guatemalan society has come a far way from the
undemocratic policies, violence, and destruction characteristic
of the civil war era. The CEH, as a catalyst for democratic and
peaceful change in Guatemala, demonstrated in a tangible way
how the State was undemocratic. Therefore, the CEH directly
contributed to a more peaceful society.59 However, studies
show that many Guatemalans did not find that the CEH and its
outcomes brought an end to the violence. While genocidal
violence no longer occurs, scholars have pointed to an increase
in the incidence of common crimes in Guatemala.60 Moreover,
observers are quick to point out the continued presence of
armed military personnel throughout the country— an
indicator of the country’s “incomplete transition to a civiliancontrolled democracy.”61 Laura Arriaza and Naomi RohtArriaza criticize the CEH as a short-term truth seeking
mechanism that is not capable of garnering widespread trust
among the people; for these scholars, national-level initiatives
such as the CEH must be accompanied by other mechanisms in
order to be efficient in the long-term, especially in rural areas.62
59
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The ineffectiveness of the CEH in the short-term caused
groups such as the Catholic Church and civil society to embark
on their own efforts of justice, as extensions of the CEH’s
findings and recommendations.
In briefly examining the role of the Catholic Church
and civil society, this paper argues that while it still has a long
way to go, both groups have been instrumental in pushing the
agendas of peace and democracy onto Guatemalan society.
The Catholic Church and REMHI
The 1994 peace talks provided a basis for Guatemalan society
to seek out the truth for itself. Therefore, before the CEH was
formed, the Catholic Church in Guatemala embarked on the
Recuperation of Historical Memory Project (Recuperacion de la
Memoria Histórica, or REMHI). As the CEH’s investigations
took place, REMHI grew to be a project that filled in some of
the gaps that existed in CEH’s mandate.63 Methodologically,
REMHI served as a precedent for the CEH in terms of
collecting testimonies and visiting rural communities.64
The church’s report, titled “Guatemala: Never Again!”
(Guatemala: Nunca Mas!) was the result of 5,500 victim-survivor
testimonies and was published before the CEH report, in April
1998.65 The report accused the armed forces of genocide before
the CEH report conclusively found the same.
As a constant during both times of war and peace, the
Catholic Church served as a beacon of progress for those who
sought to move society towards lasting peace and democracy.
Scholar David Crocker asserts that non-governmental groups
such as the Catholic Church help people survive repression or
civil war and then begin the onerous process of
democratization.66 Because it did not rely on the CEH or its
63
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findings, the Catholic Church was able to set in motion the
process of democratization through its own unofficial truth
commission. Moreover, as a pillar of morality, the Church and
other religious organizations have the unique opportunity to
facilitate reconciliation in post-conflict environments. Through
its visits to rural communities and collection of testimonies, the
Catholic Church was able to do just this. Therefore, while not
directly connected to the CEH, the Catholic Church assisted in
achieving such goals as reconciliation and a historical narrative.
REMHI did not have the short-term mandate that CEH did,
and having started before the latter commission did, the
Catholic Church’s TC project has the potential to have longterm effects towards the democratization of Guatemala.
Civil Society: Human Rights Activists, Rural Communities, and
Women’s Groups
Literature on the CEH often cites Guatemala as unique because
of the significant role played by civil society. However, there
are conflicting views on civil society’s direct involvement in the
formation of the CEH. Some scholars contend that civil society
was bypassed in the negotiations.67 Others point to the role of
the Assembly of Civil Society (ACS), a group comprised of
many different representatives who submitted their positions
on the CEH negotiations to the UN mediator.68 There seems to
be a consensus on civil society’s instrumental role in passing the
National Reconciliation Law, which excluded from the amnesty
those who were accused of crimes against humanity as defined
by international law.69
But the long-term effects of the CEH are seen in civil
society through the actions of various groups including human
67
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rights activists, rural communities, and women’s groups. Firstly,
while opposing the CEH’s pro-amnesty mandate, human rights
groups sought to push the CEH to its limits in terms of its
capabilities.70 Moreover, several Guatemalan NGOs were seen
as keeping public pressure on the CEH to name perpetrators
and not merely profile patterns of human rights abuses.71 While
the former goal was not achieved, these organizations, such as
the human rights activists in the region of Rabinal, contributed
to substantive features of democratization.72 Rabinal human
rights groups asserted their rights and freedoms as Guatemalan
citizens through such things as protests.73 In the long-term,
these groups, empowered by the CEH and its findings, show
promise to push the country’s agenda for democratization.
The second group within civil society assisting in the
movement towards democracy in Guatemala were rural
communities. These areas were directly affected by the
atrocities addressed by the CEH. Therefore, in order for
complete long-term transition into democracy to occur, these
rural communities must come to terms with their experiences,
and assert their rights as citizens—something the massacres
intended to rob them of by physically obliterating the habitats
of rural peoples in Guatemala. The most recent manifestation
of the rural communities’ search for truth is houses of memory.
Essentially miniature museums, these houses serve as a place
for local groups to display customs and history and reference
the massacres. Laura Arriaza and Naomi-Roht Arriaza contend
that these houses continue the work of the CEH by continuing
to unearth the historical narrative.74 Therefore, rural
communities contribute to a more democratic society by
continuing their search for truth.

70
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Finally, women’s groups are a part of civil society and
have continued the work of the CEH to further their own path
towards peace and democracy. Taking place in March 2010, the
Tribunal of Conscience for Women Survivors of Sexual
Violence during the Armed Conflict Guatemala was an
unofficial TC organized by several civil society groups.75 The
CEH report noted that violence against women was severely
underreported and underexamined.76 Initiatives such as 2010’s
Tribunal took the CEH’s findings and applied them in the longterm to facilitate reconciliation in groups within civil society
that were affected by the massacres. In this way, they contribute
to democratization in the long-term by empowering these
otherwise oppressed groups within Guatemalan society.
Both the Catholic Church and civil society groups
shared an anger at the CEH’s truth-seeking process, which was
seen as being self-serving to its framers (the government, army,
and rebels), and as failing to address the needs of those most
affected (civilians).77 They both utilized this anger to initiate
their own measures of transitional justice, influenced negatively
and positively by the CEH and its findings. Unlike the shortterm mandate of the CEH, these groups have been
instrumental in implementing long-term change towards the
ultimate goal of a peaceful and democratic Guatemalan society.
Conclusion
Above all, the CEH was instrumental in creating a basis for
truth for Guatemalan society. Yet, the commission was careful
not to place the blame on history itself. The CEH charged
individual authors of violence—the government, army, rebels,
and society-at-large—of the gross violations of human rights
that occurred during Guatemala’s war torn years.78 Through an
examination of the various actors involved in the creation,
75 Crosby
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implementation, and outcome of the CEH, this paper has
analysed the short-term and long-term objectives of the CEH
as a truth commission. This paper found that the government,
army, and rebel group were at best partially effective in being
accountable for their actions, and eliminating impunity. In the
long-term, this paper found that the Catholic Church and civil
society contributed and continue to contribute significantly to
the progress of democracy using their own mechanisms of
justice, influenced by the CEH and its findings. As a whole,
Guatemala has a come a long way from its violent and
undemocratic society almost two decades ago. However, there
is still much that needs to be done in the transitioning of
Guatemala into a peaceful and democratic nation.
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